REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (HONORS) LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO, SPRING 2018

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This course will explore the systematic (often quantitative) evidence scholars have gathered to shed light on fundamental questions about whether effective representation is realized in the United States and whether the idea of a government that responds to public demands is actually a good idea. Is the citizenry capable of directing their representatives coherently? Do they reward and punish elected officials sensibly? Do policy-makers respond to public demands? To what extent to group identities substitute for careful consideration of the pros and cons of policy alternatives and choices on Election Day?

When you complete this course successfully, you will...

- ...be familiar with various ways to conceptualize representation.
- ...understand the evidence empirical researchers have marshalled to assess whether public demands are effectively represented by policy makers, as well as the limitations of that evidence.
- ...know more about how well prepared the public—arguably the key "enforcer" in a representative system of government—is to fulfill its role in American democracy.
- ...be better prepared to think carefully about the health of contemporary American democracy.

1 Course Requirements and Expectations

1.1 Assignments

READING. Much of this class will run as a discussion-focused seminar, so it is essential that you complete assigned readings prior to our class meetings.

Books you need to buy

- Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

With the exception of a handful of readings that are chapters from books (available under Readings on Sakai), you should be able to access other readings by clicking on their titles on the schedule below. I encourage you to read the assigned readings each week in the order they appear in on the syllabus. This will matter more some weeks than others. Please bring the readings for the week to class meetings.

PARTICIPATION: 10%. I will lecture during portions of most class meetings, this lecturing will be designed to provide substantive background information, introductions to particular empirical methods, and a framework for our discussion. However, my intent is that the bulk of our meetings will be discussion-based. All students are expected to participate during class meetings and 10% of your grade will be based on both the quality and quantity of your participation. Given that this class only meets once per week, unexcused absences (see below) will result in an automatic deduction of 10% from this portion of your grade (a 1% penalty for your course grade).

Although I certainly hope this will not be necessary for an honors seminar, I reserve the right to administer in-class "pop quizzes" if I sense that many students are not completing the readings. These quiz scores will be factored into your participation grade.

REVIEW PRESENTATION/ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: 10%. Each student will present an "executive summary" of the previous meeting at the beginning of one class meeting. Your presentation will be *strictly* capped at 10 minutes and should concisely review the key arguments and evidence presented in the readings from the previous week. You may also note key debates/critiques from class discussion the previous week. You are welcome to use PowerPoint to organize your presentation if you wish. The first presentation will kick off our third class meeting (reviewing material from Week 2).

As you prepare your presentation you should draft an annotated bibliography. The document should start with a one paragraph summary of the theme for the week. The remainder of the document will consist of brief descriptions of each reading (absolutely no more than 300 words per reading/chapter). These should describe the key question(s) the authors addressed, how they addressed it, and the conclusions they reached. Note that during your presentation other students or I may point out facets of the readings or themes from the previous week that you did not mention that we see as important. You will revise your bibliography as necessary and send it to me (in Microsoft Word format) no later than start of the following class meeting. I will post the document to Sakai for other students to access in two formats: the as-is Word document and via a Wiki (which will allow others to add to it—no word length constraints—or revise).

You will be graded on the clarity of your presentation and the guide you produce—both of which should be thorough *but concise*. Part of the challenge will be to distinguish the core components of the readings from interesting, but not critical, details.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: 1% EACH (X 10). For class meetings 3 through 14 each student should email me a list of 3-5 suggested discussion questions for our class meeting by midnight on the Monday before we meet (I will drop your 2 lowest scores out of the 12 sets of discussion questions you write). Discussion questions should be designed to stimulate class discussion by raising clear normative or empirical questions about the readings. Please see the How to Write Seminar Discussion Questions document under Resources on Sakai for more details and guidance.

I will aggregate and organize these discussion questions prior to our class meeting. Be attentive to what types of questions stimulate discussion and which do not. As the semester progresses I expect that you will write increasingly effective discussion questions (i.e., my grading will shift from essentially giving you credit for submitting questions to deducting points for sloppy or trivial questions). Note that in order for these discussion questions to be useful I must receive them in time to prepare them for use in our class meeting—they will not be accepted late.

Analysis Papers: 5% Each (x 6). You will write 6 brief (2-3 pages, double-spaced, 12 pt Times New Roman font) analysis papers. These papers should NOT be summaries of the readings. Instead they should critique a specific aspect of a reading (or readings) or compare/contrast readings from the week (with one another or with readings from previous weeks of the course). You may consider: 1) critiquing or comparing the approaches authors use to test their theories; 2) synthesizing and/or contrasting findings from different readings from the week and earlier in the course; 3) critiquing or comparing how authors conceive of and measure a concept (and perhaps suggesting ways to improve these measures); 4) carefully considering the implications of the findings from the readings—what do they say about the health of American democracy?; 5) identifying unanswered questions and, ideally, how researchers might attempt to answer them.

The best papers will be tightly focused (e.g., addressing one of the above questions), clearly written, and demonstrate that you have completed the readings and reflected on them.¹ You cannot write a response paper for the first or second class meeting or for the last meeting. Thus, you must write papers for 6 of the remaining 11 meetings. I strongly encourage you to plan ahead and not put yourself in a situation where you have to write response papers every week for six weeks straight. Papers for a given week's reading must be submitted prior to the start of that week's meeting—they will not be accepted late.

FINAL PAPER: 20%. You will write a 7-10 page essay that draws robustly on course materials to make an argument about the health of democratic representation in the United States. You should begin by making an argument about what you see as the key elements of high quality representation. The paper is due at our final regular class meeting on April 24. You will be graded on the clarity of your argument, how effectively you use course materials, and style (e.g., spelling/grammar/organization).

FINAL EXAM: 20%. The final exam will cover material from the entire course. Details about the exam will be provided later in the semester.

1.2 Course Grade

Each assignment will be given a letter grade. These grades will be converted to percentage scores as follows: A = 95%; A = 91%; B + 88%; B = 85%; B = 81%; C + 78%; C = 75%; C = 71%; C = 68%; C = 65%; C = 65%;

Grading Rubric and Scale:

Final Exam: 25%

The scoring rubric above and the thresholds for various letter grades are non-negotiable. I will not change your numeric grade to "bump you up" to the next letter grade. For example, if your final score in the class is 86.9, your letter grade for the class will be a B, not a B+ just because you are so close.

1.3 Additional Policies and Notes

MISSED CLASSES/LATE ASSIGNMENTS: The only excusable reasons for missing a class or exam or handing in an assignment late are serious illnesses and family emergencies. In either case you must both 1) notify me of your situation in a timely manner and 2) provide appropriate documentation. If you submit your final paper late, without documentation, I will deduct 10 points (out of 100) for each day it is late.

STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES: If you have a documented disability and wish to discuss academic accommodations, please contact me as soon as possible.

¹Example: if you make an argument in your paper that one author's approach could be improved in a particular way and fail to discuss the fact that another reading from that week does exactly what you are suggesting, this would suggest that you have not completed the readings for the week.

ACADEMIC DISHONESTY will not be tolerated. Incidents of plagiarism or cheating on an exam will result in a grade of F (zero) on the assignment or exam in question. The behavior will be reported to the chair of your major department and to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. When you submit your papers via Sakai they will automatically be checked for plagiarism by Turnitin.com. This service compares your paper with materials available through the internet, published work, and papers submitted by other students (from Loyola and elsewhere).

2 Class Schedule and Reading Assignments

2.1 Foundations

MEETING 1: JANUARY 16. Introduction

- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Chapter 3; 15 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]
- Excerpts from Federalist 10, 51, 55, 57, and the Anti-Federalist Papers. [SAKAI RE-SOURCES]
- Burke, Edmund (1774). Speech to the Electors of Bristol (at the Conclusion of the Poll). [SAKAI RESOURCES]

MEETING 2: JANUARY 23. Models of Representation

- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Chapters 4-5; 27 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]
- Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. "Rethinking Representation." American Political Science Review 97: 515-528. (13 pgs.)
- Rehfeld, Andrew. 2009. "Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 103: 214-230 (16 pgs.)

MEETING 3: JANUARY 30. What Kind of Representation Does the Public Want?

Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs
About How Government Should Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters
1-2, 4-6 = 120 pgs.)

MEETING 4: FEBRUARY 6. Do Policy-Makers Respond to Public Demands?

- Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." American Political Science Review 57: 45-56 (11 pgs.)
- Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." American Political Science Review 72: 535-547 (12 pgs.)
- Page, Benjamin I. and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy."
 American Political Science Review 77: 175-190. (15 pgs.)
- Thomas, Martin. 1985. "Election Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Voting." American Journal of Political Science 29: 96-111. (15 pgs.)

MEETING 5: FEBRUARY 13. Inequality and Representation

- Bartels, Larry M. 2005. "Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind." *Perspectives on Politics* 3: 15-29. (14 pgs.)
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2005. "Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control." *Perspectives on Politics* 3: 33-53. (20 pgs.)
- Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69: 778-796. (18 pgs.)
- Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12: 564-581. (17 pgs.)

Meeting 6: February 20. Descriptive Representation

- Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'." *Journal of Politics* 61: 628-657. (29 pgs.)
- Bratton, Kathleen A. and Leonard P. Ray. 2002. "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway." American Journal of Political Science 46: 428-437. (9 pgs.)
- Broockman, David E. 2013. "Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Blacks' Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives." American Journal of Political Science 57: 521536. (15 pgs.)
- Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. "Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress Matter?" Legislative Studies Quarterly 37: 5-34. (29 pgs.)

2.2 Critiquing the Democratic Ideal

MEETING 7: FEBRUARY 27. Aggregating Opinion and Intro to Public Competence

- Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections
 Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters
 1-2 (50 pgs.).
- Ellenberg, Jordan. 2014. How Not to Be Wrong: The Power of Mathematical Thinking. New York: Penguin Books. Chapter 17. (28 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Chapters 6-9; 48 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]

SPRING BREAK - NO CLASS: MARCH 6.

MEETING 8: MARCH 13. Public Competence I: Can the Public Make Good (Enough) Decisions?

- Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." American Political Science Review 88: 63-76.
- Kuklinski James H., and Quirk, Paul J. 2000. "Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion." In Arthur Lupia, Mathew D.McCubbins, and Samuel L.Popkin (eds.), Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, pp.153182. New York: Cambridge University Press. (29 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]
- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapter 3.

MEETING 9: MARCH 20. Public Competence II: The Role of Elites

- Bartels, Brandon L., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Explaining Processes of Institutional Opinion Leadership." Journal of Politics 71: 249-261. (12 pgs.)
- Kertzer, Joshua and Thomas Zeitzoff. Forthcoming. "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy." *American Journal of Political Science*. (15 pgs.)
- Druckman, James N. and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence." American Journal of Political Science 47: 729-745. (16 pgs.)
- Sheffer, Lior, Peter J. Loewen, Stuart Soroka, Stefaan Walgrave, and Tamir Sheafer. Forthcoming. "Nonrepresentative Representatives: An Experimental Study of the Decision Making of Elected Politicians." *American Political Science Review.* (20 pgs.)

MEETING 10: MARCH 27. Retrospective Voting I

- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapters 4-5 (56 pgs.).
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1978. "Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 22: 426-443. (18 pgs.)
- Healy, Andrew J., Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2010. "Irrelevant Events Affect Voters' Evaluations of Government Performance." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 107: 1280412809. (5 pgs.) Supplemental Materials

MEETING 11: APRIL 3. Retrospective Voting II

- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapter 6 (31 pgs.).
- Hibbs, Douglas A. Obama's Reelection Prospects under "Bread and Peace" Voting in the 2012 US Presidential Election." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 45: 635-639. (4 pgs)
- Healy, Andrew and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2014. "Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy." *American Journal of Political Science* 58: 31-47. (16 pgs.)
- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapter 7 (36 pgs.).

MEETING 12: APRIL 10. Group Identity

- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapter 8 (19 pgs.).
- Craig, Maureen A. and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014. "On the Precipice of a 'Majority-Minority' America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology." Psychological Science 25: 11891197. (8 pgs.)
- Kuo, Alexander, Neil Malhotra, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. 2015. "Why Do Asian Americans Identify as Democrats? Testing Theories of Social Exclusion and Intergroup Commonality." Working Paper. (40 pgs. excluding Online Appendix)

Meeting 13: April 17. Partisanship

- Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2004. Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 2 and 8. (52 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]
- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapters 9-10 (65 pgs.).

MEETING 14: APRIL 24. Course Wrap-Up and the Way Forward

- Achen and Bartels. 2016. "Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government." Chapter 11 (32 pgs.).
- Golder, Matt and Jacek Stramski. 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions." American Journal of Political Science 54: 90-106. (16 pgs.)
- Rehfeld, Andrew. 2005. The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 7 and 9. (61 pgs.) [SAKAI RESOURCES]

FINAL EXAM: MAY 1.